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This is
distributInterest in the evolution and maintenance of personality is burgeoning. Individuals of diverse animal
species differ in their aggressiveness, fearfulness, sociability and activity. Strong trade-offs, mutation–
selection balance, spatio-temporal fluctuations in selection, frequency dependence and good-genes mate
choice are invoked to explain heritable personality variation, yet for continuous behavioural traits, it
remains unclear which selective force is likely to maintain distinct polymorphisms. Using a model of trust
and cooperation, we show how allowing individuals to monitor each other’s cooperative tendencies, at a
cost, can select for heritable polymorphisms in trustworthiness. This variation, in turn, favours costly
‘social awareness’ in some individuals. Feedback of this sort can explain the individual differences in trust
and trustworthiness so often documented by economists in experimental public goods games across a
range of cultures. Our work adds to growing evidence that evolutionary game theorists can no longer afford
to ignore the importance of real world inter-individual variation in their models.
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It is increasingly evident that individuals of a diverse range
of species show consistent differences in their behaviour,
even under standardized conditions (Wilson et al. 1994;
Wilson 1998; Budaev et al. 1999a,b; Gosling & John 1999;
Fischbacher et al. 2001; Gosling 2001; Sih et al. 2004b).
Such ‘personality types’ (Pervin & John 1999) may be
stable across contexts, e.g. an individual that is aggressive
towards conspecifics may also be bolder in exploring novel
environments; Dingemanse & Reale 2005a) and/or over
time within a single context, e.g. in the presence of a
potential predator, individuals may show consistent flight
reactions over long periods of time (Boissy 1995; Sih et al.
2004b). Interest in the evolution and maintenance of such
behavioural variation is burgeoning (Macdonald 1995;
Dall et al. 2004; Sih et al. 2004a; Dingemanse & Reale
2005b; Nettle 2005; McElreath & Strimling 2006; Nettle
2006; Reale et al. 2007; Stamps 2007; Wolf et al. 2007).
Recent modelling work (McElreath & Strimling 2006;
Wolf et al. 2007) has focused on potential adaptive
explanations of consistency across contexts. Here, by
contrast, we assume individual differences that are stable
over time, and explore the evolutionary consequences of
such personality differences within a particular context.
Our aim is to identify a selective force that can maintain a
range of such personalities within the same population.
Specifically, in a cooperative context, we are interested in
how selection can prevent all interacting individuals
evolving towards the same monomorphic optimum.r for correspondence (sashadall@iname.com).
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an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creat
ion, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original worEvolutionary game theory shows that, in principle,
frequency-dependent selection can maintain a range of
trait values within the same population. But the crucial
question is often what biological factor (or factors) is likely
to generate the requisite frequency-dependent effects?
Here, we offer a novel perspective on this question. Put
succinctly, we show that natural variation in a social
context can itself promote frequency dependence. In other
words, variation provides the necessary selection pressure
to generate variation.
Within evolutionary game theory, the traditional
approach focuses on the mean values of continuous traits.
The implication is that this will approximate reality
when the variance in trait values is small. However, this
ignores the fact that in real populations traits often
exhibit substantial levels of variation. In social contexts,
once variation is non-negligible, there can be a need to be
socially aware, and once individuals are socially aware this
changes the selection pressure on all behavioural traits.
The resulting evolutionary outcome is then likely to be
totally different from that predicted by the traditional
approach (McNamara et al. 2004). Here, we provide an
example in which some individuals are socially aware at
evolutionary stability. This results in disruptive selection
on the continuous trait being monitored socially. The
resultant variation in this trait in turn provides the need for
social awareness.
Our focus on a cooperative context is motivated by
evidence from experimental economics that people from
many cultural backgrounds show consistent differences
in their strategic approaches to cooperative economic
games, with subjects often exhibiting a range of strategies
from completely trusting and trustworthy to tactical
cooperation and free riding (Fischbacher et al. 2001;This journal is q 2008 The Royal Society
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Houser 2005). Indeed, individual differences in neural
activity in brain areas associated with reward processing
during altruistic giving (Harbaugh et al. 2007) and
punishment (de Quervain et al. 2004) are also being
documented. This diversity is particularly striking since
traditional game theoretic analyses of cooperation
between non-relatives, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma
(Axelrod & Hamilton 1981), typically predict outcomes
that lack inter-individual variation in cooperative
tendencies (but see Boyd et al. 2003). Our analysis
therefore offers a novel adaptive explanation for real
world variation in a key human feature.P1 pay-off = 0
P2 pay-off = 1
Figure 1. Decision tree for the trust and cooperation game
in the simple version (without sampling), showing path-
ways and outcomes contingent on the behaviours of
individuals adopting the role of P1 and individuals adopting
the role of P2.(a) Social awareness in a game of trust and
cooperation
We illustrate our general thesis using a variant of the two-
player game of Guth & Kliemt (2000). This game
provides a convenient framework for analysing the
evolution of trust and cooperation. Pairwise interactions
proceed in two phases (figure 1). One individual, chosen
at random, is assigned to the role of player one (P1), while
the other is assigned to the role of player two (P2). In the
first phase, P1 decides whether to trust P2. If P2 is not
trusted, both individuals receive a reward s, the non-
cooperator’s pay-off. If P2 is trusted, the game moves to a
second phase in which P2 decides whether to cooperate or
not (i.e. defect). If P2 cooperates, both individuals receive
the cooperator’s pay-off r. If P2 does not cooperate, P2
receives a pay-off of 1, while P1 gets nothing. Reward
magnitudes satisfy 0!s!r!1.
When P1 has no information about P2 (e.g. individuals
only ever interact once), this game has a simple
evolutionarily stable outcome. If trusted, it is best for P2
to defect. If P2 will defect P1 does best not to trust P2.
Thus, at evolutionary stability, P1 never trusts P2 and
both players get pay-off s; had they been trusting and
cooperative, they would both have received the higher pay-
off, r. This game can be regarded as a variant of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game (Axelrod & Hamilton 1981).
In our extension of this game, we allow P1 to gain
information about P2, and let the frequencies of
behavioural types evolve as frequency-dependent
responses to each other. We make three principal changes
to the basic model analysed elsewhere (Guth & Kliemt
2000; McNamara & Houston 2002).
(i) Previous formulations (McNamara & Houston
2002) considered the unrealistic case where P2
always cooperated or always defected. Typically,
however, heritable behavioural traits are continu-
ously distributed within populations (Dall et al.
2004; Dingemanse et al. 2004; van Oers et al. 2005;
Blumstein et al. 2006; Penke et al. 2007). To reflect
this, we model an individual’s heritable (uncondi-
tional) tendency to cooperate in role P2 as specified
by p (0%p%1), where p is the probability of
cooperating.
(ii) To highlight the importance of social awareness, P1
individuals have the option of obtaining infor-
mation on P2s at a cost. In our specific model, this
information is observed by sampling; we allow P1
to observe n previous P2 decisions by the
individuals playing P2 and base their decision onProc. R. Soc. B (2009)what they observe. Specifically, the heritable trait of
P1s is their tendency to accept P2s in phase 1 of the
game. They may be unconditional accepters (UA;
always accepting P2 without sampling), uncondi-
tional rejecters (UR; always rejecting P2 without
sampling) or one of n sampling types. The sampling
types are specified by an integer k where 1%k%n.
Type k samplers accept the P2 if and only if the P2
was trustworthy on at least k of the n occasions.
Samplers pay a cost c (0%c!s) reflecting, for
example, the costs of using and maintaining the
cognitive machinery required to keep track of the
behaviour of others (Stephens 2007). Uncondi-
tional strategies do not pay a sampling cost.
Completely consistent (UA, UR) and/or less stable
(type k samplers) individual patterns of P1 trust are
free to evolve in our formulation.
(iii) Mutation is a ubiquitous source of trait variation in
biological systems and can have unexpected effects
on the direction of selection (McNamara et al.
2004, 2008) so we allow for both P1 and P2 traits
to be inherited with mutation.2. MATERIAL AND METHODS
We model an infinite population of actors playing the
asymmetric game outlined in figure 1. Each individual carries
genes specifying behaviour in each of its two possible roles. In
each role an individual receives a pay-off that depends on its
trait in this role. This pay-off equals the mean outcome of all
interactions with other members of the population when in
that role; essentially we assume that in each generation, each
individual interacts with many other individuals chosen at
random. The fitness of an individual equals the sum of its
pay-offs in the two roles. Note, however, that since the pay-off
in one role does not depend on the pay-off in the other role, at
evolutionary stability the trait values in one role are
statistically independent of the trait values in the other role.
This means that when we track evolution to find an evolu-
tionarily stable strategy, we do not need to keep track of the
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the genes controlling the P2 trait. Instead, we can just keep
track of the distribution of the P1 trait and the distribution
of the P2 trait.
Behaviour in the P1 role is controlled by trait 1, defined as
either unconditional rejecters (UR), unconditional accepters
(UA) or type k samplers (1%k%n), where n is a constant. For
ease of notation, we refer to all possible P1 types by their
associated k trait value. In particular, URs are assumed to
have a trait value of kZnC1 (i.e. they will never sample or
cooperate, because a P2 can never be observed to be
trustworthy nC1 times out of n trials), while UAs are
assumed to have a trait value of kZ0 (i.e. they will always
cooperate without sampling because, out of n trials, the
number of observations of a P2 being trustworthy will always
be R0). Trait 1 value k occurs in the population with
frequency f1(k), where
PnC1
kZ0 f1ðkÞZ1.
P2 behaviour is controlled by trait 2, conceptualized as a
continuum of values, p, in the range 0%p%1, to capture the
continuous nature of such an unconditional behavioural trait.
However, for computational purposes, we represent p on a
fine discrete grid; pZ0, 0.01, 0.02,., 0.99, 1. Trait 2 value p
occurs in the population with frequency f2( p), whereP
pf2ðpÞZ1. Evolution of the two traits is not directly linked
(except through frequency dependence).
We start with some initial frequency distribution for both
traits and iterate one generation at a time. In each generation,
new frequencies of each trait value for both traits 1 and 2 are
calculated as detailed below. The model continues until stable
distributions of frequencies are reached (determined when
summed absolute changes, D, fall below a predefined
tolerance; all results reported here used a tolerance of 10K9).(a) Trait fitness
Pay-offs resulting from dyadic interactions are illustrated in
figure 1. For unconditional trait 1 values (kZ0 and kZnC1)
P1 does not assess P2’s previous behaviour and so pays
no assessment cost (cZ0). In all other situations (1%k%n),
P1 pays the assessment cost, c (where 0!c!s). So far, for
clarity, we have described strategic interactions as particular
outcomes within a stochastic framework. Nevertheless, to
gain general insight into the evolutionary implications of our
logic, we analyse expected outcomes in an infinite population
as follows.
The probability that P1 trusts P2 is given by
aðk; pÞZ
Xn
xZk
n!
x!ðnKxÞ! p
xð1KpÞnKx for 1%k%n; ð2:1Þ
with að0; pÞZ1 and aðnC1; pÞZ0.
Equation (2.1) arises because P2 behaviour in interactions
is a binomial process (they can cooperate or defect). The term
within the summation reflects this, showing the binomial
probability that P2 is seen to cooperate x times in n trials. This
is summed for all xRk.
The mean pay-off to P1 for a random interaction is
given by
w1ðkÞZ
X
p
f2ðpÞ 1Kaðk; pÞ
 
sCaðk; pÞpr Kc
for 1%k%n; or; ð2:2aÞ
w1ðkÞZ
X
p
f2ðpÞ 1Kaðk; pÞ
 
sCaðk; pÞpr 
otherwise: ð2:2bÞProc. R. Soc. B (2009)Equations (2.2a) and (2.2b) differ only because samplers
are assumed to pay a cost of sampling, c. Otherwise, both
formulations show (within braces) that the expected reward
of an interaction with a given type of P2 is the non-
cooperator’s pay-off, s, multiplied by the probability of not
trusting P2, 1Ka(k,p), plus the probability of trusting P2,
a(k,p), multiplied by the pay-off from doing so, pr. This is
summed over all possible P2 types that the P1 can encounter,
weighted by the probability of such an encounter.
For a P2 with trait 2 value p, the mean pay-off from an
interaction with a random actor is given by
w2ðpÞZ
XnC1
kZ0
f1ðkÞ 1Kaðk; pÞ
 
sCaðk; pÞ prC ð1KpÞ  :
ð2:3Þ
Equation (2.3) is similar to the pay-offs for P1s. Within the
braces, the first term shows the probability that the P1 does not
trust, multiplied by the non-cooperator’s pay-off, s. The
second term shows the probability that the P2 is trusted,
multiplied by the pay-off to the P2 from such an interaction.
The latter pay-off has two components: either P2 cooperates
(with probability p), in which case the pay-off is r, or P2 defects
(with probability 1Kp), in which case the pay-off is 1. Again,
the pay-offs are summed for all possible P1 types that can be
encountered, weighted by the probability of such encounters.(b) Changing trait frequencies
Mutation rates in the model are controlled by three separate
parameters (figure 2). For P1s, mutation from URs to UAs
(and vice versa), from kZ1 samplers to UAs, from kZn
samplers to URs, and between kZi samplers and kZiC1
samplers (and vice versa), occurs at the rate 31 in each
generation. To represent lower rates of mutation from
unconditional strategies to the more sophisticated sampler
strategies, mutation from UAs to kZ1 samplers and from URs
to kZn samplers, occurs at a lower rate h (h%31/2). This seems
biologically realistic, since the more sophisticated samplers
may be less likely to arise by chance from the unconditional
acceptors or rejecters—for instance, the origin of conditionality
may require relatively more mutational steps than switching
from one unconditional action to another (or varying levels of
scepticism) because the ability to elicit both actions as well as
process information must be acquired. Using a mutation rate
from unconditional to conditional strategies that is lower than
that between other pairs of P1 traits i.e. (h!31) does not
increase the frequency with which disruptive selection occurs
on the P2 trait). However, it does emphasize that disruptive
selection is a consequence of genuine selection for conditional
P1 traits, rather than mutation to those traits alone. Indeed,
several variant sets of assumptions regarding mutation on the
P1 trait were examined (including uniform mutation rates
between conditional and unconditional traits, and potential
mutation between all trait values); all variants produced
the general effects that we report here. Finally, P2 mutation
occurs between neighbouring trait values on the grid of values
at the rate 32.
For unconditional P1 trait values, recruitment, R(k), is
given by
R1ðkÞZ
ð1K 31KhÞ f 1ð0Þw1ð0ÞC31 f 1ð1Þw1ð1Þ
C31 f 1ðnC1Þw1ðnC1Þ; kZ0;
ð1K 31KhÞ f1ðnC1Þw1ðnC1Þ
C31 f 1ðnÞw1ðnÞC31 f 1ð0Þw1ð0Þ; kZ nC1:
8><
>:
ð2:4Þ
Figure 2. Flow diagram illustrating the source of recruitment to each P1 trait value in the nZ3 case (corresponds to equation
(2.7) in the main text). Note that mutation between similar types (i.e. between unconditional traits or between conditional traits)
occurs at the rate 31. Mutation from conditional to unconditional types also occurs at that rate. By contrast, mutation from
unconditional to conditional types is assumed to occur at a lower rate, h, where h%0.531 (see text for further details), reflecting
the lower likelihood of the more complex, sampling strategies arising.
608 J. M. McNamara et al. Evolution of trust and trustworthinessHere, the total recruits produced by individuals bearing any
trait value are given by the frequency of that trait value
multiplied by its fitness. Total recruitment in either case is the
sum of recruits from three sources, corresponding to the three
terms: from individuals with the focal trait (subtracting 31Ch
that mutate away from that trait); from individuals with the
neighbouring trait (including only the 31 recruits that mutate
to the focal trait); and from the other unconditional strategy
(again, including only the 31 recruits that mutate to the focal
trait). Note that for nZ0, hZ0 and the second term in each
case in equation (2.4) is omitted.
For samplers (occurring only when nO0), the situation is
slightly more complicated. Specifically, if nZ1, recruitment is
given by
R1ðkÞZ ð1K231Þf1ð1Þw1ð1ÞCh f1ð0Þw1ð0Þ
Ch f1ðnC1Þw1ðnC1Þ: ð2:5Þ
Here, the first term corresponds to recruitment from the
focal trait (subtracting the 231 recruits that mutate away from
that trait). The second and third terms correspond to low
levels of recruitment arising from mutation in recruits of the
two unconditional strategies. When nZ2, recruitment is
R1ðkÞZ
ð1K231Þf1ð1Þw1ð1ÞChf 1ð0Þw1ð0Þ
C31 f 1ð2Þw1ð2Þ; kZ1;
ð1K231Þf1ð2Þw1ð2ÞChf 1ðnC1Þw1ðnC1Þ
C31 f 1ð1Þw1ð1Þ; kZ2:
8><
>:
ð2:6Þ
Finally, for nR3, recruitment is given by
R1ðkÞZ
ð1K231Þ f 1ð1Þw1ð1ÞCh f1ð0Þw1ð0Þ
C31 f 1ð2Þw1ð2Þ; kZ1;
ð1K231Þ f 1ðkÞw1ðkÞC31 f 1ðkK1Þw1ðkK1Þ
C31 f 1ðkC1Þw1ðkC1Þ; 1!k!n;
ð1K231Þ f1ðnÞw1ðnÞCh f1ðnC1Þw1ðnC1Þ
C31 f 1ðnK1Þw1ðnK1Þ; kZn:
8>>>>><
>>>>>:
ð2:7Þ
For clarity, this more complex situation is illustrated in
figure 2.Proc. R. Soc. B (2009)The frequency of individuals carrying trait value k in the
next generation is then calculated as
f 01ðkÞZ R1ðkÞPnC1
kZ0
R1ðkÞ
: ð2:8Þ
The process of calculating changes in the frequencies of
values for trait 2 is similar, as follows. Recall that trait 2 is
modelled as discrete, with potential values separated by the
interval iZ0.01 (i.e. P2 traits had 101 possible values). First,
recruitment is calculated by
R2ðpÞZ
ð1K32Þ f2ð0Þw2ð0ÞC32 f 2ði Þw2ði Þ; pZ0;
ð1K232Þ f2ðpÞw2ðpÞC32 f 2ð pKiÞw2ðpKi Þ
C32 f 2ð pCi Þw2ðpCi Þ; 0!p!1;
ð1K32Þ f2ð1Þw2ð1ÞC32 f 2ð1KiÞw2ð1Ki Þ; pZ1:
8>><
>>:
ð2:9Þ
The frequency of individuals carrying trait 2 value p in the
next generation is then calculated as
f 02ðpÞZ R2ðpÞP
pR2ðpÞ : ð2:10Þ
(c) Assessing stability
For some parameter sets stable solutions could not be found,
even after running simulations for very long time frames
(greater than 107 generations). Typically, simulations that
failed to stabilize were characterized by fluctuations in the
summed absolute changes of trait frequencies, D, with no
downward trend in that value. Consequently, all simulations
that failed to stabilize were terminated after 107 generations or
after 50 000 changes in the direction of magnitude ofD (recor-
ded following the first 105 generations). Extensive compu-
tations revealed that results were entirely robust to initial
conditions (i.e. initial frequency distributions on the two traits).3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
To illustrate the crucial role of social awareness in driving
polymorphisms in P2 behaviour, consider first the case
where no sampling is possible (nZ0). All P2s do equally
Box 1. Variation in P2 behaviour favours P1 samplers and vice versa.
Consider a population where the P2 trait p has mean mZE{ p} and variance s2Zvar( p). In this population, the pay-off to
an unconditional accepter (UA) is
WUAZE fprgZmr;
and the pay-off to an unconditional rejecter (UR) is
WURZ s:
Thus
WUAOWUR5mO s=r:
Now suppose that nZ1. In this case, a sampler accepts a P2 if and only if they are observed to be trustworthy on the one
occasion they are observed (kZ1). Suppose that a P2 has trait value p. Then a sampler rejects this P2 (receiving pay-off s)
with probability 1Kp and accepts the P2 (receiving expected pay-off pr) with probability p. Thus, in its interaction with this
particular P2, a sampler has expected pay-off
w ðpÞZ ð1KpÞsCp2rKc:
The mean pay-off to the sampler is therefore
WsZE fw ð pÞgZ ð1KmÞsC ðm2Cs2ÞrKc:
This formula shows that both the mean and variance of p affect the pay-off for sampling. When mZs/r, so that UAs and URs
do equally well, it is easy to see that samplers do better if and only if
s
2Oc=r:
For other values of m, the variance (s2) needs to be higher still if samplers are to do better than both UAs and URs.
With this population the pay-offs to a P2 player with trait value p in an interaction with a UA, a UR, and a sampler are
VUAðpÞZ1Kð1KrÞp;
VURðpÞZ s;
and
Vsð pÞZ sC ð1KsÞpKð1KrÞp3;
respectively. Thus pay-off has a maximum at pZ0 in an interaction with a UA. In an interaction with a sampler, pay-off is
maximized at
pZminf1; ð1KsÞ=2ð1KrÞg:
In particular, it is maximized at an intermediate value of p provided 2rKs!1. This intermediate value of p is an optimal
compromise: as p increases, the probability of being trusted increases, but the pay-off to the P2 (if it is trusted) decreases.
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mutation always ensures the presence of some UAs
(which can also increase in frequency if p drifts to
sufficiently high levels). This favours untrustworthy
behaviour because pay-offs for P2s decrease linearly with
their increasing p in the presence of UAs (box 1); the result
is a modal value of p at zero (and therefore the presence of
UAs is only driven by mutation) as illustrated in figure 3a.
Thus, it is not possible to maintain reasonable levels of
trustworthiness (and trust) without social awareness
(Guth & Kliemt 2000; McNamara & Houston 2002).
When sampling is possible (nR1) the presence of
samplers selects for some degree of trustworthiness in the
P2 trait, while the presence of UAs selects for untrust-
worthiness (box 1). The relative frequencies of samplers
and UAs determine the direction of selection on the P2
trait (recall all P2s do equally well against URs). Thus,
even if both samplers and UAs are selected against, the low
absolute numbers of samplers maintained by mutation–
selection balance can select for trustworthiness in the P2
trait. To avoid this occurring, we set the rate of mutation to
sampling types to be much lower than between UAs and
URs (see §2). As a consequence, in the results we present
below, levels of samplers are maintained through activeProc. R. Soc. B (2009)selection (rather than simply by mutation). In general, if
there is little variation in the P2 trait then UAs or URs (or
both) have higher pay-offs than samplers (box 1). This is
because it is only worth paying the cost of sampling if
there is something useful to be learnt by sampling. Thus,
at evolutionary stability, sampling is maintained by
frequency-dependent selection only if sufficient variation
in the P2 trait is maintained.
In the simplest case where sampling is possible (nZ1)
P1s are limited to UAs, samplers with kZ1 and URs.
Extensive computations reveal only unimodal distri-
butions of the P2 trait at evolutionary stability. When
the P2 trait mutation rate is low, the variation in this
trait is low; selection acts against samplers and the modal
value of the P2 trait is zero (figure 3b). As the mutation
rate increases (figure 3b–d ), the increased variance
can mean that it is worth paying the cost of sampling
(box 1). When this happens, the direction of selection on
the P2 trait changes and the modal value of the P2 trait
increases (figure 3d ).
When opportunities exist for more extended social
observation (nR2) a second, novel mechanism can
maintain variation in the P2 trait. For example, when
nZ2 a P1 population consisting of a mixture of UAs, URs
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Figure 3. Example outcomes from the asymmetric trust and cooperation game. (a(i),(ii)) nZ0 and sampling is thus not possible.
Even with high mutation on the P2 trait (32Z0.1) the modal value of p is always zero. Other parameters: sZ0.3; rZ0.6;
31Z0.0001. (b–d ) nZ1, permitting some samplers (denoted Sa.). In each case, sZ0.3; rZ0.6; cZ0.005; 31Z0.0001;
hZ0.00001. Mutation on the P2 trait is increasing: (b(i),(ii)) 32Z0.001; (c(i),(ii)) 32Z0.01; (d(i),(ii)) 32Z0.1. Note that for low
and moderate mutation on the P2 trait (b,c), P1s gain nothing by sampling. However, when P2 mutation is high (d ), sampling by
P1s is worthwhile; the presence of samplers ensures increased trustworthiness among P2s. (e(i),(ii)) Example of a stable,
bimodal outcome when nZ2. Parameter values: sZ0.56; rZ0.77; cZ0.04; 31Z0.001; hZ0.0004; 32Z0.08. In this situation,
the mixture of P1 traits, which includes samplers, maintains a bimodal distribution of P2 traits. The bimodal distribution of
P2 traits maintains the need to sample, and hence maintains the P1 mixture.
610 J. M. McNamara et al. Evolution of trust and trustworthinessand samplers (mostly quite sceptical kZ2 types) and a
bimodal P2 population can be evolutionarily stable
(figure 3e). As stated above, UR individuals have no effect
on the direction of selection on the P2 trait. Thus, this
direction is determined by the ratio of UAs to samplers. P2sProc. R. Soc. B (2009)maximize their pay-off in interactions with UAs by being
completely untrustworthy ( pZ0). In interactions with
samplers the P2 pay-off is maximized at an intermediate
value of p. This value is a compromise between gaining
acceptance through a high p value and optimally exploiting
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Figure 4. Cyclical dynamics in the asymmetric trust game. (a–d ) An example of cyclical dynamics for nZ2: (a) Frequencies of
P1 traits (green curve, UA; orange curve, Sa. (kZ1); blue curve, Sa. (kZ2); black curve, UR), (b) frequencies of selected P2
traits (violet curve, pZ1.00; green curve, pZ0.75; orange curve, pZ0.50; blue curve, pZ0.25; black curve, pZ0.00),
(c) summary characteristics of trustworthiness in P2s (orange curve, mean p; black curve, var ( p)) and (d ) contour diagram of
fluctuating P2 frequencies (all trait values). Note that, at the start of the time frame, P2s of moderate to high trustworthiness
predominate in the population. This promotes the frequency of UAs, in turn selecting for less trustworthy P2s, and reducing the
mean trustworthiness in the P2 population (c). Decreasing trustworthiness selects for URs and against more cooperative P1s (a).
Selection on P2s is thus reversed and mean trustworthiness increases, eventually returning the situation to its starting
conditions. (a–d ) Shows slightly over one full cycle. Sa., samplers.
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Proc. R. Soc. B (2009)P1 once accepted. The mixture of UAs and samplers at
evolutionary stability results in P2 fitness being a bimodal
function of p with two equally high peaks, one involving
complete and consistent untrustworthiness ( pZ0) and the
other at a positive, but less consistent, level of trustworthi-
ness. Consequently, there is disruptive selection on the P2
trait, and the evolutionarily stable distribution of this trait is
bimodal. This bimodal distribution means that there is high
variance in the P2 trait, ensuring that sampling is
maintained. In other words, the mixture of P1 traits,
which includes samplers, maintains a bimodal distribution
of P2 traits. The bimodal distribution of P2 traits maintains
the need to sample, and hence maintains the P1 mixture.
Bimodal solutions can either be stable, as in figure 3e or
maintained as a result of cycling. The forces giving rise to
these outcomes are the same. The dynamics maintaining
polymorphisms are illustrated in figure 4. Increasing n
above 2 leads to an increase in the proportion of unstable
and bimodal outcomes (figure 5). Examples for nZ3 and
nZ4 are shown in figure 6.
Our analysis clearly demonstrates how social aware-
ness—trusting on the basis of prior evidence of trust-
worthy behaviour—can encourage variability in
trustworthiness. Such variability in turn favours someFigure 5. As opportunities for social observation increase
(i.e. as n increases: (a), nZ2; (b), nZ3; (c), nZ4), so the
proportion of parameter space producing stable bimodal
(bottom circles) or unstable (middle circles) increases (total
bimodal and unstable cases are indicated by the top circles).
In each case, parameter space was sampled randomly by
selecting 105 parameter sets, each selected in the following
order: s (0.1!s!0.8); r (sC0.05!r!1.0); c (0.001!c!s/2); 32
(0.001!32!0.1); 31 (0.0002!31!32/10); h (31/100!h!31/2).
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Figure 6. Examples of stable, bimodal outcomes where greater opportunities exist for P1s to monitor the behaviour of P2s.
(a(i),(ii)) nZ3; sZ0.48; rZ0.88; cZ0.04; 31Z0.00045; hZ0.00021; 32Z0.08. (b(i),(ii)) nZ4; sZ0.49; rZ0.85; cZ0.03;
31Z0.00072; hZ0.00033; 32Z0.11. Sa., samplers.
612 J. M. McNamara et al. Evolution of trust and trustworthinesssocially aware individuals, even when their awareness is
costly (Nettle 2006). In our model, individuals can gain
information about others by observing their behaviour in
the past, with the parameter n representing the quality of
this information. There is a certain lack of realism in this
formulation. In particular, we might expect that in a real
population the ease with which P2 can be observed being
trusted by others would depend on the number of UAs. In
the current model, however, we have chosen not to allow n
to vary with the proportion of UAs. This is because our
general conclusion is not restricted to the specific manner
in which information is obtained; it applies to any system
in which an individual can gain information about others
at a cost. Potential methods of acquiring information
include communication of information by third parties
(when the cost is in terms of the time needed to interact
with others and be part of a social network), and acquiring
information by observing facial expression (when the cost
is in terms of development of the neural machinery needed
to interpret facial expressions). Although we analyse a
specific model, our general message—that variation begets
variation in social contexts—has broad implications for
the analysis of evolutionary games in biology and to a wide
range of disciplines that use game theory. Game theory
needs to take both variance and social sensitivity into
account in a systematic manner if it is to be an effective
tool for dealing with real populations and in particular
when dealing with the inter-individual variation associated
with personality.
Our formulation can also be related to models of indirect
reciprocity and the evolution of cooperation (Nowak &
Sigmund 1998; Leimar & Hammerstein 2001). Nowak &
Sigmund (1998) studied a game in which a donor decides
whether to give aid to a recipient. The donor’s decision
depends on the image score of the recipient. An individual’s
image score increases when the individual is observed to give
aid to another individual and decreases when the individual
is observed not giving aid when a donation was possible. In
this game, donors should be concerned about their
reputation and hence, as Leimar & Hammerstein (2001)Proc. R. Soc. B (2009)pointed out, donors should base their decisions on their
own image score rather than on the image score of the
recipient. Although our model involves observations and a
form of assessment, our pay-off structure differs from that
of Nowak & Sigmund. In our game, the pay-off to P1
depends on the accuracy with which P1 assess the personality
of P2. It is therefore reasonable for P1 to make decisions on
the basis of a score that is assigned to P2. Furthermore, P1 is
not observed so there is no pressure on P1 to establish a
reputation. These features mean that the objection raised by
Leimar and Hammerstein does not apply.
Finally, our work demonstrates how the diversity in
trust and trustworthiness so often documented in
experimental public goods games (Fischbacher et al.
2001; Fehr & Fischbacher 2003; Henrich et al. 2005;
Kurzban & Houser 2005) can evolve in response to the
premiums on selfishness in the presence of trusting
individuals (who cannot be bothered to monitor the social
interactions going on around them), coupled with some
incidence of monitoring effort that such selfishness
necessitates. Thus, the ‘arms race between observing
and being observed’ (Milinski & Rockenbach 2007) may
explain yet another important facet of human altruism and
altruistic tendencies.
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